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ABSTRACT
The growth of the Internet has created a corresponding growth in Internet-based crimes and online
misbehavior, particularly among younger computer-savvy people. Younger generations have grown up in a
world where internet access, social networking, e-commerce and smartphones are commonplace. Given this
fact, they have learned how to use, and how to abuse, technology. This leads us to define a new category of
cybercrime called a Personal Denial of Service attack (PDOS). A PDOS is a cyber-crime in which an
individual deliberately prevents the access of another individual or small group to online services such as
email or banking. Due to the nature of a PDOS, these acts can be overlooked by law enforcement and
organizations that operate Internet infrastructure, such as universities. Our motivation for this work is
twofold: to stress the need for cyber ethics education at the university level, and to illustrate how a previously
uncategorized type of cyber crime is easily perpetrated in such an environment. To achieve these goals, we
define a PDOS attack and discuss how it differs from other categories of attacks. We also examine the
motivation for a PDOS attack in the context of the Routine Activities Theory of criminal justice. We further
discuss a "proof of concept" survey administered at four different universities to ascertain their attitudes
towards online account breaches as related to a PDOS attack. The survey provides initial evidence that
account breaches, which are an integral part of a PDOS attack, are a worrisome threat on university campuses
and further points to a need for cyber ethics training.
Keywords: Personal Denial of Service (PDOS) attack, Routine Activities theory
participating in Massively Multiplayer Online
Games (MMOG's), chatting and posting information
on Facebook, and managing their bank accounts and
financial information online are everyday activities
for a generation born in the Internet age.
Unfortunately, with the knowledge of how to

1. INTRODUCTION
The explosive growth of the Internet across the
world has created a burgeoning generation of young
people who are very computer-savvy and that spend
a good deal of their time online. Activities such as
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conduct their lives with devices linked to the vast
information superhighway, comes the ability to be
tempted by its darker side. Posting child
pornography online, cyber bullying, and
perpetrating Internet fraud are just a few examples
of the unethical and illegal activities that some
Internet users engage in. The potential reasons for
initiating these activities are myriad, but Routine
Activities Theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) has
been put forth to help explain the origins of crimes
such as these. Part of the premise of Routine
Activities Theory is the presumption that anyone
may commit a crime if given the opportunity or
circumstances to do so. A related presumption that
follows from this is that victims of such crimes
consciously placed themselves in situations where
such crimes may occur. These notions, although
controversial
to
some
sociologists
and
criminologists, set the stage for the discussion and
analysis of our proposed category of cyber-crime:
Personal Denial of Service Attack (PDOS).

form, a PDOS can be performed using public
information such as an email address.
This research examines an environment where
unlimited Internet access and close proximity to
potential victims provides a perfect setting for such
attacks to go un-policed. An example of this would
be universities, where Internet-savvy young people,
many with the "gaming" mentality, advanced online
technical knowledge, and underdeveloped ethics, are
prime candidates to commit a PDOS attack. While
some people may view the results of a PDOS as
nothing more than a minor inconvenience, it has the
potential for causing monetary and life-changing
results. Consider the example of a person who pays
credit card and other bills via online banking on the
day that they are due. If such a person is denied
access to the online banking site on the due date for
bills, and does not have the time or means to contact
the bank or companies involved to make other
payment arrangements, such a person may incur late
fees for a late payment, a reduced credit score, an
increase in interest rates on credit cards and other
financial penalties.

A PDOS is an attack on a person or small group
where access to online services is denied through a
clever manipulation of the security procedures and
safeguards used by the online service providers.
With the reliance on "the cloud" for using remotely
hosted applications (as is the case with the use of
Application Service Providers (ASPs) for many
businesses
and
organizations
nowadays),
synchronizing applications between devices (such as
Apple computers and devices), storage (Dropobx
and many other cloud or online based storage
applications), and a myriad of other purposes,
uninterrupted access to online services accounts is
not just a luxury, but a necessity for everyday life.
Although similar at first thought to a Denial of
Service (DoS) attack, a PDOS distinguishes itself
through the sequence of actions used to carry it out
and through its intended number of victims.
Comparisons to other forms of cyber-crime such as
cyber-stalking (which includes cyber-harassment as
a subcategory) also fall short due to the fact that no
private information concerning a victim is necessary
to carry out a simple PDOS attack. According to
Wikipedia, in the context of cyber-harassment, “the
definition of ‘harassment’ must meet the criterion
that a reasonable person, in possession of the same
information, would regard it as sufficient to cause
another reasonable person distress In its simplest

PDOS attacks have the potential to cause further
financial harm when they exploit account auto
lockout security procedures in online auction
sites. Perhaps two users, user A and user B are
competing against each other for an auction item.
There is potential for user A to lock out user B using
publicly available account ID information by simply
attempting to log in as user B several times with
incorrect passwords. If timed correctly near the end
of the auction, user A can ensure that user B does not
win the auction, and therefore user A has a greater
chance of winning the auction item. This action
would not only financially hurt the seller, but the
auction site as well since they would receive a
smaller commission from the sale assuming that
further competition between A and B would have
driven up the final auction price.
Pogue points out that with the most recent version of
the Apple Macintosh operating system, the
synchronization of calendars, address books, etc.,
with other Apple devices must be accomplished
through Apple's iCloud online service (Pogue,
2014). A disruption to accessing one's account on
this service could have serious ramifications, both
professionally and personally. Another example of
the potential harm caused by a PDOS could involve
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a university student who waits literally until the last
minute to turn in a take-home exam or assignment.
If denied access to their university account and
unable to turn in the exam or assignment before the
deadline, the denial of online access could cost the
student dearly in terms of their final class grade, their
grade point average, their class ranking, their
scholarship, and thus their attractiveness to company
employment recruiters. Any time-sensitive
transaction, be it financial in nature or not, that
requires online services to complete, has the
potential for disruption by a PDOS. The potentially
serious impact of a PDOS, when combined with the
possibility of an escalation of a PDOS attacker to
more serious cyber-crimes, points out the need for
education on online ethics and how to avoid
becoming a victim of such attacks.

services and accounts used by a single person or
small group of people. In a traditional DoS attack,
the victim is an organization or company that
operates the device, network, or system targeted.
Time, money, and human resources must be spent by
the victim in order to recover from a successful DoS,
or even to react to an attempted one if detected.
Secondary victims are possible in a traditional DoS
if legitimate outside users or customers are also
affected. Unlike a DoS, a PDOS would be intended
to have a single individual as a victim or a small
group of people. Secondary victims of a PDOS could
include the companies providing the online services
targeted by the attacker in that resources must be
used to create new accounts, change account
parameters, and/or deal with the primary victim.
To show the gravity of a PDOS attack and further
illustrate the difference between a PDOS and a
traditional DoS, we pose two simple questions. The
first of these is whether the resources invested to
prevent or remedy DoS attacks differ from PDOS
attacks in the corporate world. The second is
whether the notoriety surrounding, and potential
impacts of, traditional DoS attacks differ from
PDOS attacks. When potentially thousands of users
are impacted by a DoS attack, the resources spent
can be quite staggering depending upon the size of
the company or organization involved. The costs
associated with firewalls, intrusion detection
systems, and bringing networks and devices back to
fully operational state are not trivial. Resources
spent with regards to a potential PDOS attack would
only involve policies and procedures that limit
personal and account information from being
utilized for such attacks. Although the costs
associated with putting such policies and procedures
in place are not zero, they would certainly not
approach those expended for DoS attacks.
Furthermore, a DoS is usually newsworthy event
where a company’s operations, and therefore its
revenue stream and profitability, are adversely
impacted. A PDOS would not necessarily affect a
company’s operations other than possibly disrupting
the life of an employee or small group. It should be
clear from this discussion that a PDOS attack is not
specifically planned by a corporate information
security function in an organization. However, to the
person impacted by the PDOS attack, be it a
consumer trying to access a website in order to make
a purchase, or an employee attempting to access

2. DEFINITION OF A PDOS
The term PDOS should be distinguished from the
recently contrived acronym PDoS. This latter type of
cyber-crime attack, a Permanent Denial of Service
(PDoS) or "Phlashing", is a cyber-security breach
that exploits vulnerabilities in network-based
firmware updates and attempts to render the target
device(s) inoperable. A PDoS is an example of the
more general type of cyber-crime called a Denial of
Service attack (DoS). Our proposed category,
PDOS, is distinct from both a PDoS and its related
more general category DoS. In its most general
definition, a DoS is an information security breach
or attack that attempts to render a device, a network,
or a system unavailable to its intended users. The
new type of cyber-crime attack we are proposing, a
PDOS, is similar in spirit to a DoS in that it attempts
to render online services unavailable to a person or
small group of people while remaining anonymous,
but differs from a traditional DoS attack in several
ways. These differences include the intended victim
of the attack, the nature of the targeted device or
devices, the sequence of actions to conduct the
attack itself, the potential results of a successful
attack, the nature of anonymity, and the motivation
for the attack.
2.1 Intended Victim
While a traditional DoS attack is directed towards
the information assets and/or network infrastructure
of a company, government, or other type of
organization, a PDOS is directed at the online
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their online banking account during lunch hour, the
results are the same. Both are denied access. This
research puts forth the premise that a PDOS is a
novel type of attack that “falls under the radar”, but
has an impact similar to a DoS on a smaller, more
personal scale.

service be restored. Unlike a traditional DoS, one
might state that no "hacking" actually occurs against
the online service provider in a PDOS; and therefore,
it may not be considered illegal in many
jurisdictions. A DoS attack requires special
knowledge of the network or system being attacked
to be successful. Such knowledge is usually gained
from one or more smaller reconnaissance attacks
that are used to learn about network security
mechanisms and technical vulnerabilities of the
target. On the other hand, a PDOS attacker can
utilize information that is more easily obtained to
carry out a successful attack. Information, such as
email addresses, may be publicly available; and
techniques such as social engineering can be used for
gather the requisite information for an attack.
Sometimes an action as simple as looking over a
person's shoulder as they log in to an online service
is all that is needed for a successful PDOS.

2.2 Nature of Targeted Devices
A traditional DoS targets devices (network
infrastructure, servers, etc.) operated by an
organization in order to limit their functionality. A
PDOS does not target a given set of devices, but
instead targets the services provided such an
infrastructure to an individual or small group,
including both local and cloud resources. A clear
distinction with respect to this factor is that an
attacker must have some minimum knowledge of the
devices being attacked for a DoS to be successful. In
the case of a PDOS, no such knowledge is necessary
to carry out the attack; only knowledge of how to
access those services online is required.

2.4 Potential Results of a Successful Attack
A successful DoS renders a web server, a network, a
system, etc., (the target of the attack) inaccessible to
legitimate users for an indefinite period of time. This
period of time can vary and depends on three major
criteria:

2.3 Sequence of Actions to Conduct a PDOS
Unlike a DoS, a PDOS does not attempt to actually
manipulate a device, a network, service, or a system
to prevent its proper functioning. In fact a PDOS
would take advantage of security measures put in
place by network, system, and security
administrators to mask the PDOS activities to ensure
such an attack would succeed. For example, a
traditional DoS might flood a given company's web
server with excess "useless" traffic in order to
overwhelm it capability to serve legitimate online
customers. In this case the attacker is attempting to
disguise the excess traffic as legitimate traffic until
it overwhelms the server. A PDOS takes the opposite
approach. It deliberately wants user traffic, or the
attempt to access services to be seen as a threat to the
online service provider in order to have existing
security measures enacted. An example of a PDOS
taking advantage of security measures would be the
ability to "lock out" an online service user's account
by attempting to log onto that account multiple times
unsuccessfully. The intent of the PDOS in this case
is not to gain actual access to the account, but to
prevent the legitimate user from having access to the
account for an indefinite period of time. Only after
the legitimate user takes certain steps, such as
changing a password or contacting the online service
provider to provide verification of identity, can the

a. The ability of the organization operating the
target(s) attacked to recognize the attack and
take remedial action.
b. The nature of the target attacked (type of
device or system).
c. The specific technical details of the DoS
(which can vary and affect the ability of the
organization to recognize the DoS and take
action).
DoS attacks are usually recognized and acted upon
by the victim in time periods of seconds or minutes
and not hours or days. In contrast to the potential for
very costly and serious results of a successful DoS,
the results of a successful PDOS are much harder to
detect and much less evident to everyone, including
the primary victim. The inability to access an online
service such as banking, email, social media, etc.,
while creating feelings of frustration or anger from
the victim, may be incorrectly attributed to a variety
of non-PDOS causes. Some of the possible problems
that a PDOS could be attributed to (from the victim's
point of view) include excessive network traffic,
Internet connectivity problems, web server
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problems, Domain Name Server (DNS) problems, or
a forgotten password. It would take possibly several
successful PDOS attacks for a victim to even realize
that such an attack has occurred. Even if the victim
realizes there is something amiss, it is likely he or
she has not documented the attacks or has any true
understanding of what a PDOS attack is. Unlike the
steps a company or organization would take to
remedy a DoS and to prevent another one (such as
immediately blocking certain open ports and
developing a profile for the traffic signature of the
attack), a victim of a PDOS would have little
recourse other than to change the parameters of
existing accounts (passwords, account names, etc.)
and to create new accounts, possibly with different
online service providers. It should be obvious that
only the most cautious of online service users would
take such actions after a single successful PDOS
attack. It would most likely take several successful
PDOS attacks to prompt such actions from a victim.

opportunistic terms, with the Internet giving users
'the chance to conceal their identity and hence make
it easier for them to be deceitful (Selwyn, 2008)."
The ease with which a PDOS attacker can initially
conceal his or her identity for a few attacks certainly
distinguishes this type of attack from a traditional
DoS. It would only be after at least a few PDOS
attacks that the victim would be suspicious and
possibly take action such as having online service
providers track attempts to login to his or her
account. Such conditions would necessarily force an
attacker who wishes to continue PDOS attacks to use
more technical and complex means for anonymity.
2.6 Motivation of the Attacker
The motivation for conducting a DoS can vary and
includes the following possibilities:
a. Corporate espionage where a hired attacker
is paid to attack the e-commerce or other
information systems capabilities and
functions of a competitor.
b. The making of a political statement against
a company or organization through an
announced attack.
c. An amateurish "script kiddie" attack for
amusement or challenge.
d. Disgruntled employee or customer seeking
revenge; and other similar forms of
motivation.

2.5 Nature of the Anonymity
A further difference between a DoS and a PDOS is
the degree of sophistication for achieving anonymity
to which an attacker has to achieve in order to have
a successful attack. A DoS attacker would need to
have a high level of sophistication in his or her attack
in order to remain anonymous if attacking a
company or organization with even modest
information security protection in place. A
Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS), which
would use remote programs installed on unknowing
participants' devices to carry out an attack, in some
sense guarantees initial anonymity for the attacker.
In this case, anonymity is achieved due to the fact
that the actual attack is not coming from the attacker
per se, but from other innocent parties. A PDOS
would differ from both of these in that the attacker
needs much less sophistication to remain
anonymous. For instance, the use of a proxy server
to access online accounts would only be necessary
for an occasional PDOS attack in order to hide the
attacker's IP address. Only if an attacker seeks to
continue a series of PDOS attacks against a target
would more sophistication be necessary. "Criminals
hide in cyberspace, but complete invisibility can
sometimes be difficult to achieve (Wild, et al.,
2011)." Selwyn surveyed university students about
online misbehavior and pointed out that "some
respondents described such anonymity in

Only the last two in this list might be considered
somewhat similar to a PDOS. Revenge would
certainly be a possible motive for a PDOS; but
unlike a DoS where the revenge is directed at an
organization, it would be directed at an individual or
small group. There are also other factors related to
motivation that set the two types of attacks apart.
The likelihood that a victim would suffer through
several successful PDOS attacks before taking
action is an important difference between a PDOS
and a traditional DoS. This likelihood would also
play a role in the motivation of the attacker. The
likelihood of success of a PDOS is high, if an
attacker has basic knowledge about the victim,
online services and the Internet in general. Some
limited knowledge of the victim such as what
services are used and possibly a general pattern of
when those services are accessed are required for a
successful PDOS. This knowledge can be gained in
a variety of ways that vary from intimate contact
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with the victim to social engineering where no
relationship with the victim is required. The ease
with which this knowledge can be acquired can be
additional motivation for this type of attack.
Obviously this knowledge threshold is much lower
than what is required for a successful DoS, where
technical knowledge is required about computer
networking and an organization's possible cyber
security defenses.

methodologies normally reserved for more serious
security breaches of companies (such as the
disguising of IP addresses previously mentioned)
against an individual or small group of people.
Therefore, although one might be tempted to
categorize a PDOS as just another form of cyber
harassment, the additional technical sophistication
sets it apart. A PDOS can be distinguished from
cyber stalking because the latter has a more
ominous, malevolent, and physically dangerous
nature. Generally speaking, a cyber-stalker seeks to
use a cyber- presence to exert some degree of control
over a person or group and may even threaten or
commit physical violence against victim(s). In
attempting to exert control, the identity of the stalker
may be revealed to the victim(s). Reyns, et al. (2011)
define cyber stalking as "the repeated pursuit of an
individual using electronic or Internet-capable
devices". Unlike a cyber-stalker, a PDOS attacker is
not in "pursuit" of a victim. A PDOS also would not
want his or her identity known to the victim since it
would make future attacks more difficult. While the
threat of physical violence is absent in our definition
of a PDOS, an attacker's actions could escalate into
cyber stalking or other more serious crimes against
a victim. Even with the lack of a physical threat and
an anonymous attacker, the element of seeking to
exert control over a victim(s) is allowed under our
definition of a PDOS. It is possible for an attacker
committing a series of PDOS attacks to attempt to
influence the victim in some way. An example of
this would be a series of attacks conducted by an
estranged husband against his wife during
acrimonious divorce proceedings. Such attacks, if
conducted properly (so as to be not traceable back to
him) might create such frustration on her part that
she is more willing to negotiate during divorce
proceedings. Even if she suspected that he is the
source of the attacks, without proper evidence,
which would be difficult or possibly impossible to
collect, no action could be taken against him.

3. CLASSIFYING A PDOS
We propose that a PDOS be considered a new
category of cyber-crime. It does not fit in traditional
categories such as those proposed by Yar (2006). He
defines four categories of cybercrime:
a. Cyber-trespass – crossing boundaries into
other people's property and/or causing
damage.
b. Cyber-deceptions and theft – stealing and
fraud.
c. Cyber-pornography – breaching laws on
obscenity and decency.
d. Cyber-violence – doing psychological harm
to, or inciting physical harm against others.
One might consider the frustration experienced and
time wasted by a PDOS victim when not being able
to access online services to be a form of
psychological harm, but a PDOS differs from
traditional forms of cyber-crime that would fit into
the category of cyber-violence. Unlike cyber
stalking, in which the attacker often intentionally
makes his or her identity known to the victim, a
PDOS is carried out in a truly anonymous fashion
due to the ability to disguise one's cyber presence as
the source of an attack with limited technical
expertise. Cyber harassment can loosely define the
motivation for a PDOS, but unlike traditional cyber
harassment where a person sends disparaging
electronic communications or posts such content
online, a PDOS has a direct connection to the
availability of an online service providers' accounts.
For example, it takes little technical skill to post false
or disparaging comments on social media such as
Facebook about a victim of cyber harassment; but to
disguise one's online identity in order to carry out a
PDOS to deny a person access to their Facebook
account requires a slightly higher level of expertise.
What also makes a PDOS a new phenomenon in the
context of cyber-crime and information security
theory is the use of information security

Neves and Pinheiro (2010) define cyber bullying as
the use of communication technologies and
information to denigrate, humiliate and/or defame a
person or a group of people. A PDOS can be
distinguished from this definition because the
destruction of a person's character or reputation is
not the motivation for a PDOS attack. It may become
a secondary result of multiple PDOS attacks, but the
attacker is not intending such consequences directly.
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One characteristic of a PDOS that sets it apart is the
necessity to disguise one's electronic identity in
order to carry out a series of PDOS attacks. To mask
one's Internet Protocol (IP) address, an attacker
could use strategies involving proxy servers, onion
routing (of which the application Tor is the most
popular example), or other similar mechanisms. To
mask one's Media Access Control (MAC) address,
methodologies exist to "spoof" this factory-set
address inherent to all network interfaces of
electronic devices that are on local area networks. It
should be obvious that although the knowledge of
how to hide one's electronic fingerprint is available
online, this technical expertise would set it apart
from traditional cyber harassment.

that the more time you spend in cyberspace, the more
likely you are to be either an offender or a victim for
a cybercrime. Marcum later used Routine Activities
Theory as the backdrop for a statistical assessment
of cyber-crime and its impact on adolescents
(Marcum, 2009).
A corollary also put forth by Yar (2005) is that "the
greater the target's accessibility, the greater its
suitability, and vice versa". This particular point
supports the premise that unlimited Internet access
in the relative absence of authority, as is seen on
university campuses in computer laboratories,
dormitories, etc., provides such great accessibility.
Additionally, work by Holt and Bossler (2009)
concludes that "committing computer-based
deviance (the more formal term for unethical and
illegal behavior in the literature) increases one's risk
of online victimization, mirroring previous research
that has identified an association between real-world
delinquent behavior and victimization".

4. ROUTINE ACTIVITIES THEORY AND
CYBERCRIMES
Cohen and Felson (1979) describe the foundations
for what is known as the Routine Activities Theory.
"Not only do routine legitimate activities often
provide the wherewithal to commit offenses or to
guard against others who do so, but they also provide
offenders with suitable targets" (Cohen and Felson,
1979). The application of this theory in practice has
focused on three necessary, but not sufficient,
conditions within a given physical space or arena for
crime to occur: the existence of a potential offender,
the existence of a potential target, and the lack of
authority necessary to prevent a crime from
occurring. The application of Routine Activities
Theory has been extended and applied beyond
traditional high crime rates areas of physical space.
It has also been applied across a variety of settings
beyond chance physical encounters of an attacker
and a victim. Miller posits that "... an individual's
activities, regardless of whether unstructured, with
friends, or absent authority figures, are carried out in
a variety of physical and social settings" (Miller,
2013). Some of these settings the theory has been
applied to are general usage of the Internet and
computer networks, social media, and online
gaming. The linking of Routine Activities Theory to
cybercrime was developed by Yar (2005). "In short,
the online density of both potential offenders and
potential targets is not neutral with respect to
existing social ecologies, but translates them via the
differential distribution of the resources and skills
needed to be present and active in cyberspace" (Yar,
2005). This statement can be simplified to the notion

Reyns (2013) analyzed the link between Routine
Activities Theory and identity theft. He states that
"results suggest that individuals who use the Internet
for banking and/or e-mailing/instant messaging are
about 50 percent more likely to be victims of identity
theft than others". In other words, by merely using
such online services, the risk of falling victim to this
serious type of cybercrime increases dramatically.
Along this same line of thinking, Hutchings and
Hayes, in applying Routine Activities Theory to
Phishing victimization, found that the routine
activities of computer use and Internet banking were
risk factors for phishing attacks, another type of
cyber crime.
Navarro and Jasinski (2012) analyzed cyber bullying
in the context of the Routine Activities Theory. One
interesting result coming out of their work points to
an increased likelihood of becoming a victim of
cyber bullying for young people who spend a good
deal of time on "informative" websites, where a two
way sharing of information (posting and reading) is
conducted. Pratt, et al. (2010) applied the Routine
Activities Theory to Internet fraud. They concluded
that "to understand the problem of fraud targeting
requires an appreciation of how online exposure
shapes the opportunity structure for victimization in
this context" (Pratt, et al., 2010). We posit that the
large percentage of university students who spend a
significant percentage of their time conducting these
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online activities such as banking, emailing, and
posting information online, thus exposing
themselves to potential attackers, not only put
themselves at risk for Internet fraud, identity theft,
phishing attacks, or cyber bullying, but are also at
risk for a PDOS.

Adding further evidence to the bending of online
ethics rules by the online gaming community is the
sales of "booting" services. Booting is define as the
commercialization of "kicking" where an online
gamer can pay a third party to perform kicking
against an opponent. This allows players seeking a
gaming advantage or a form of revenge to pay for
kicking against other online gamers of their choice
(BBC, 2009). This type of behavior reminds one of
industrial espionage where a company hires a third
party hacker to attack a competitor's systems or
network to gain a competitive advantage in the
marketplace. Such booting services do not target a
gaming console such as an Xbox directly, but rather
they interfere with the victim’s internet connection
(BBC, 2009). For approximately $20.00, some
hackers performing kicking are even willing to
remotely access their customer’s system and install
the software tools for the customer to target players
independent of the hacker (BBC, 2009). For a larger
fee, some hackers will add the machine to what is
termed a "botnet," thus enabling them to perform
more powerful buffering or true DOS (Denial of
Service) attacks against a targeted IP address (BBC,
2009). Again, the presence of an individual in the
online gaming community presents both an
opportunity to conduct such online misbehavior and
to fall victim to it.

Before focusing on the prevalence of PDOS attacks
in light of the Routine Activities Theory described
above, an examination of another Internet-based
online misbehavior will provide insight. A related,
and equally disturbing, type of online misbehavior is
called "Kicking". Kicking is a quasi-hacking
technique where an online gaming participant, such
as an Xbox user, is “kicked” of the online game they
are participating in by another participant in that
game. Utilizing free software tools, such as OXID’s
Cain and Able (OXID, 2012) password recovery
tool, the other participant actually crosses the line
and becomes a "hacker" in performing such kicking.
Using these tools, the other participant is able to gain
access to the victim gamer’s IP (Internet Protocol)
and MAC (Media Access Control) addresses. These
addresses are then exploited to force the victim out
of the game and to keep the victim from rejoining
the game for some period of time. Under our
definition of a PDOS, the denial of participation in
an online game created through "kicking" would be
considered an example of such a cyber-crime.

Gaming consoles are typically viewed as
entertainment devices by the general public. As
such, devices have migrated from single player
environments
with
rudimentary
graphical
capabilities to powerful communication hubs. This
increase in the computing power and communication
capabilities of gaming consoles has coincided with
an increase in their use for various forms of cybercrime, including crime within so-called "virtual
worlds" that are part of the gaming experience
(Pasupathi, 2001; Pew Internet Project, 2008;
Prasad, et al., 2013). The technical aspects of the
console and related player activities may lead to
victimization by other players. For example,
Microsoft's gaming console specifically controls
certain attributes, or policies, related to the amount
of user access to live gaming services. The ports on
the gaming platform utilized for these controls are
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) ports 3074, 5060,
and 5061 (CAI Networks, 2000). Considering that
UDP is a connectionless protocol, this could provide
hackers with additional vulnerabilities to exploit.

Although typically viewed by the online gaming
community and the general public as merely a form
of malicious harassment, the information obtained
through "kicking" can be used to perform more
serious spoofs and attacks. Once the other
participant has gained access to the target’s IP
address, he can then ascertain what city and state the
player is located in, determine the name of the
service provider, and perform other malicious
activities including sending a computer virus
directly to the target’s machine or employing further
reconnaissance techniques using tools such as Nmap
(Nmap.org, 2012) to obtain additional private
information about the victim. The escalation of
"kicking" into a more serious form of cyber-crime,
be it identity theft or some form of malicious
hacking, shows the potential for a PDOS to be the
precursor to more serious cyber-crimes. The fact that
"kicking" even takes place during what is supposed
to be a recreational activity also lends credence to
the notion that online ethics are viewed in terms of
"gray" and not "black and white" by online gamers.
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Also, the gaming console is connected to the Internet
and therefore is just as susceptible to online attacks.
Users need to harden their consoles similarly to how
they currently protect their computers. When a
participant or hacker attempts to perform kicking
activities they target a player’s Internet connection
and not the actual gaming console. This is possible
because the gaming console is vulnerable to attacks
involving the UDP 5060 port. Thus, when gamers
who are not familiar with such technical details
change their gaming console settings in an effort to
host games with other players, they are unknowingly
introducing more vulnerability into their systems.

a PDOS attack due to the access to high speed
Internet connectivity, close proximity to fellow
students' account information in various university
settings such as dormitories and computer
laboratories, and other questionable online behavior
that occurs in such settings. Reyns, et al. (2010)
investigated the factors connecting attackers to
victims with respect to cyber stalking and university
students. Their conclusions confirm that the
application of the Routine Activities Theory to this
cyber-crime in a university context is valid. Yar
(2006) states that "... when applied to computer
crime, such understandings attribute youthful
participation in hacking to a combination of
adolescent 'crisis' and ethical 'underdevelopment';
and conversely they can be used to explain why most
individuals 'drop out' of hacking as they reach
psychological maturity in their twenties" (Yar,
2006).

5. ROUTINE ACTIVITIES THEORY, PDOS,
AND UNETHICAL STUDENT ONLINE
BEHAVIOR
As described previously, Routine Activities Theory
in the context of a cyber-crime purports that the
probability of being a victim is increased by having
a greater cyber presence, which equates to a greater
exposure to potential attackers. A substantial case
can be made that a university environment provides
the ideal place for this to occur. Although briefly
described in the introduction, a more substantive
argument can be made for analyzing the prevalence
of cyber-crimes, including PDOS attacks, with
respect to students in a university environment. The
nature of a PDOS should be viewed in the light of
other online misbehavior and unethical activities
undertaken by computer-literate young people in
their late teens and early twenties. These students
who attend institutions of higher education have
almost limitless access to high speed networks and
Internet resources, and also less direct supervision
than they had during their younger years. In
particular, this last point fits well with the creation
of an environment where potential attackers would
feel more at ease than in the more controlled
environments of their homes or previous schools
where figures of authority had more direct control on
their actions throughout the day and night. Reyns, et
al. (2011) state that "guardianship, on the other hand,
acts as a buffer against victimization by disrupting
criminal opportunity structures, thereby decreasing
likelihood of victimization".

University students in the U.S. and some other
Western countries already have a general reputation
of compromised ethics with respect to their use of
the Internet while on campus. Activities involving
the illegal downloading of copyrighted material
(music, movies, etc.), plagiarism involving websites
(copying website content verbatim for assignments)
or purchasing fully completed assignments online
are not uncommon and often go unnoticed or
overlooked by faculty and administration. Williams
(2010) and collaborators point out that in the case of
illegal downloading of copyrighted material,
increased Internet access creates the situation where
"consumers will have the ability to download vast
amounts of material, illegally or not". Thus, the
Routine Activities Theory view of this issue would
state that university students are in an environment
where they can steal such material or have material
stolen from them.
Theft of copyrighted material over the Internet or
intellectual property locally (as would be the case if
one student copied another's assignment from his or
her computer or online data storage without
permission) on a university campus is just one
example of unethical online behavior present within
this environment. Selwyn (2008) surveyed
university students and found that 93.9% of the
respondents had perpetrated at least one of the
following five types of online misbehavior in the
year prior to the survey: misrepresentation of self,
unauthorized use of another's account, plagiarism of

While computer hacking in general can be attributed
to a lack of psychological maturity, it is our position
that the demographic of traditional-age university
students are particularly predisposed to committing
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an essay or assignment, unauthorized downloading
of music or film, and online pornography use. In
relation to a PDOS, 26% of respondents claimed to
have used another student's account without
permission at least once in the prior year.
Additionally, 2% claimed to have done this
misbehavior "more than a few times." (Selwyn,
2008). Maimon and collaborators' work that
analyzed computer-focused crimes against a large
university computer network states that "our
findings support the view that the routine-activities
and lifestyle perspective could be used to explain
cybercrime" (Maimon, 2013). Selwyn explored the
propensity of British university students to
participate is "lesser" Internet-based online
misbehavior (Selwyn, 2008). The study supports the
notion that the propensity of such students to
participate in unethical or illicit offline behaviors is
exacerbated in the online arena. These two works
from the literature support the application of Routine
Activities Theory to the online misbehavior of
university students.

found in their analysis of online gaming crime that
46.7% of the offenders were students and that most
of these crimes were committed from public
computer use areas such as Internet cafes. In fact,
they stipulated in their work, which is now almost a
decade old, that "such cyber-criminal activity within
online games is increasing at an alarming rate"
(Chen, et al., 2005). They found that the use of
another person's online gaming account (and
subsequent theft of their property within the game)
without their permission was 73.7% of all computer
gaming crime reviewed. More recent work supports
the fact that computer gaming is now conducted by
a majority of university students. Hainey, et al.
(2011) surveyed 2,218 university students and found
that 79.8% of them played some form of computer
game on a regular basis. For males this percentage
was even higher at 92.6%, as compared to 69.9% for
females. This translated to an average of 7.46 hours
per week overall with 9.02 hours for males and 4.39
hours for females. Although the percentage playing
online games was smaller (38% of surveyed
students), this is still a significant portion of the
overall student population who are familiar with the
use of the Internet to play a game against a distant
opponent. Even several years ago, Chen, et al.
(2005) noted that with the growth of online gaming,
there was a corresponding growth in gaming-related
crimes, and particularly in MMOG games.

It follows from the application of the Routine
Activities Theory that the nearly unlimited Internet
access given to university students results in many
of them engaging in questionable and possibly
illegal behavior with respect to the use of the
Internet. One of the activities that university students
regularly engage in, whether in computer
laboratories, dormitory rooms or other campus areas
of Internet access is online gaming. It is our position
that this opportunity, when combined with attitudes
and behaviors developed in other activities, such as
the participation in MMOG's, increases the
likelihood that a student would commit a PDOS. If
the intent of a PDOS attack is similar to cyber
bullying, then the attitudes fostered in MMOG's
come to light. Teng, et al. (2012) put forth that "...
some online gamers bully other gamers either for fun
or to satisfy their needs for dominance". Although
online gaming and MMOG's unto themselves are
benign upon an initial analysis and can even be used
for educational purposes, the lack of authority
overseeing these activities and the anonymity while
participating online can give way to misbehaviors
and abuses by participants.

It is not difficult to visualize the similarities between
motivating factors for committing a PDOS and the
motivation to participate in an online game. Hainey,
et al. (2001) found that "challenge" was the most
important reason for playing computer games among
the students surveyed. Among online gamers,
"competition" was the most important reason found.
A PDOS attacker, in the context of a university
setting, might be motivated by the challenge to lock
another student out of his or her online services
much the same way that computer gamer seeks the
challenge of besting an opponent through whatever
means is necessary. Likewise, competition in a class
might tempt a student to lock out another student
from student accounts in the hope that their
academic standing and grades might be adversely
affected. Universities that use course management
systems with time-oriented "dropboxes" for
assignments or online exams (as is the case with one
of the authors) would provide opportunity for such a

The participation in computer gaming, particularly
MMOG's, can foster attitudes and behaviors that
would predispose university students to commit
various types of cyber-crime. Chen, et al. (2005)
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PDOS. Tseng segmented online gamers by their
motivations:

also a college instructor of criminal justice and an
author on cyber crime. Officer Samuel Del Rosario
of Pennsylvania provided invaluable expert opinion
in framing the legal nature of a PDOS and the ability
of law enforcement to respond to concerns from a
victim of such attacks.

a. Aggressive Gamers – those who have a high
need for both "exploration" and
"aggression".
b. Social Gamers – those who have a high need
for "exploration" and a low need for
aggression.
c. Inactive Gamers – those who have a low
need for exploration and a medium need for
aggression.

6. LEGAL ASPECTS OF A PDOS

Whether it is the "online gaming mentality," the need
for control or revenge upon another, or just the
challenge of attempting an attack, the attacker might
feel confident that when committing a PDOS he or
she will suffer no legal ramifications. Selwyn (2008)
pointed out that "... there was a strong sense among
respondents that were was 'less chance of you being
caught out'." This quote from a respondent in his
research deals with what Selwyn calls the
"diminished risk of Internet-based action" in terms
of accountability for, and the monitoring of, student
actions online. He goes on to point out that
"perceptions of absolute impunity were recurrent
throughout the data". Freestone and Mitchell (2004)
state that "the Internet offers the 'advantages' of
anonymity, a reduced chance of being detected
owing to the difficulty of procuring damning
tangible evidence, and convenience to perpetrators,
allowing aberrant behavior to remain somewhat
faceless". With respect to a PDOS, the fact that it is
essentially a hybrid computer crime with a limited
impact on an individual or small group allows it to
"slip through the cracks" with respect to statutory
laws. Additionally, it is very difficult to identify a
PDOS attacker who has the requisite technical
knowledge to ensure anonymity across several
attacks and who plans such attacks to appear random
in nature from a temporal point of view. A most
worrisome aspect of a PDOS for the Information
Security/Information Technology department of a
university or institution of higher education is that a
PDOS attack is easily accomplished on their
networks and would appear to be normal Internet
traffic. A traditional DoS attack, on the other hand,
would be noticed immediately on a university
network, since the traffic would cause access failures
for the university community. On the other hand, a
PDOS attack would be nearly impossible to
distinguish from normal traffic patterns.

It should be noted that this research was conducted
with the assistance of a law enforcement officer who
specializes in the investigation and prosecution of
cyber-crime at the local, state, national and
international levels. This law enforcement officer is

Due to privacy rights, information about keystrokes
and user activity on university-owned networks and
computers cannot be made available to outside
entities without getting approval from the judicial
system. This means that in the absence of such an

Tseng found that aggressive gamers tended to be
male in gender and that inactive gamers tended to be
female in gender. Taking this information a step
further, it is not difficult to equate an aggressive
university-based gamer's high need for exploration
and aggression with online misbehavior such as
kicking or a PDOS. A single PDOS attack would be
of limited value in terms of satisfying the needs of
an aggressive gamer; most likely a series of such
attacks would be undertaken. It is known that online
gamers experience "flow" during gaming sessions.
Flow is defined as "... the holistic experience that
people feel when they act with total involvement"
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, 1997). Analogously, the
feeling of continually "besting" a victim through a
series of PDOS attacks might provide a similar
motivation and loss of a sense of surroundings.
Another potential motivating factor for a PDOS
attack in a university environment is a form of
revenge on a current or former boyfriend/girlfriend.
Melander (2009) explored the harassment of
intimate partners by university students including
methods involving information technologies.
"Although it may be overlooked, emotional violence
could be as damaging online as it is in person"
(Melander, 2009). An intimate relationship,
especially in a university environment where
students are in close proximity, would allow a
current or former significant other to have gained the
necessary knowledge of accounts and online habits
to perform a series of PDOS attacks.
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allowance, an attacker committing a PDOS on a
university computer can only be tracked internally
and in a limited fashion. Website browser history
and recorded network traffic are very limited in their
ability to signal the commission of a PDOS. It would
require more sophisticated monitoring such as a
keystroke logger or remote desktop monitoring to
identify a PDOS. This is due to the fact that even if
a given computer user was tracked to a website
where a PDOS was attempted or committed, security
built into such websites would prevent the university
network from seeing the actual keystrokes or seeing
encrypted traffic that was part of a PDOS. Only with
the use of a keystroke logger or desktop monitoring
software could a PDOS be separated from normal
website activity by a given user. Furthermore,
federal regulations regarding use of the Internet and
electronic communication are ambiguous with
respect to whether a PDOS is an illegal activity since
personally identifying information is not breached,
and private data has not been accessed. One of these
sets of regulations, the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA), deals with the illegality of
capturing transmitted information and privacy
(Reyes, et al., 2007). Since a PDOS is not capturing
any information per se and private information is not
being obtained, the researchers feel a PDOS would
not fall under its parameters. Likewise, it would not
fall under the Telecommunications Act or the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (Reyes, et al., 2007)
due to the fact that "protected" computers are not
actually being "accessed" as stated in the statute.
And even if a PDOS attack against online banking
was interpreted to be "accessing" a computer, the
scope of the statue is limited to computers of
financial institutions and the government.

believe that existing legal restrictions will not deter
PDOS attacks. Kigerl (2012) makes the case that
even if cybercrime laws exist within a country, their
effects on the prevalence of cybercrime are difficult
to predict and somewhat nebulous). In fact the
apparent ease with which a person can commit a
PDOS in the U.S. and most of the world, when
combined with no effective means to legally regulate
such actions, should allow them to continue to grow
in popularity. Only through cyber ethics education,
and increased awareness of such attacks by potential
victims, will this type of cyber crime be combated.

In the context of using a PDOS attack against a
university student, many more types of online
accounts and services used by students, beyond
online banking, could be attacked by a PDOS
without falling under the scope of this legislation.
Certainly the Communications Decency Act of 1996
could not be applied either in the case of a PDOS.
"This legislation leaves no one legally accountable
for cyber targeting (which includes cyber bullying,
harassment, stalking, defamation, threats, and so
forth)" (Shariff and Hoff, 2011). Given the difficult
nature of identifying an attack, the limited logging
of user activities, and the limited laws and
regulations with respect to this activity, the authors

The goal of the survey was to gauge student attitudes
towards actions that may be considered part of a
PDOS (attempt to breach an online account). The
students fell into two main categories with respect to
their academic pursuits and the classes utilized for
the survey: (1) Information Sciences and
Information Security; and (2) Business students.
With respect to the first category, Information
Security program students were surveyed at Dakota
State University in South Dakota and Information
Sciences and Technology program students were
surveyed at Penn State University in Pennsylvania.
Within the second category, business school
students taking MIS courses were surveyed at the

7. SURVEY OF STUDENTS IN FOUR
UNIVERSITIES
In order to help ascertain the general propensity of
university students to commit a PDOS, we
developed a brief anonymous survey consisting of
four questions that was part of a larger information
security-related paper survey given to undergraduate
students across four universities in two countries.
The survey was administered to provide a "proof of
concept" that a university campus is an environment
that would allow a PDOS to be undertaken rather
easily both through the attitudes of students
regarding laws protecting online account access and
their propensity to commit an account breach. The
survey was completely anonymous. The gender of
each respondent was not tracked because it asked
questions about activities that may be considered
unethical and possibly illegal, and because the ratio
of males to females in the class was not 1:1 (see
below). Due to this inequality and in order to avoid
any possible incentive for females to mask their
answers out of fear of being identified, the question
of gender was left out of the survey.
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New Jersey Institute of Technology in New Jersey
and at Sakarya University in Turkey. Although
gender was not tracked specifically in the survey, the
class rosters revealed the approximate ratio of male
to female for each class taking the survey. Both
business school classes were approximately a 70/30
percent ratio of male to female. The other two
classes surveyed at both the South Dakota and
Pennsylvania universities were approximately 75/25
percent male to female. The part of the survey for
this work consisted of four “Yes/No" questions
related to the unauthorized use of another person's
online account and the legality of such actions. The
4 questions in the survey are listed below:

in the action or the student believes it is a futile effort
or waste of time and resources to pursue the
perpetrator. Question 4 looks at the potential
vigilance of students against online account
breaches. One would expect a student who answers
"yes" to this question to be more vigilant and
cautious when accessing online accounts, and to
safeguard his or her account details and personal
information more closely
8. UNIVERSITY STUDENT SURVEY
RESULTS
We used the two-proportion test to see if respondents
in a given university (location or group of locations)
answer "yes" to a given question significantly more
often than respondents from another university(s).
The results from Question 1 of the survey (Table 1)
show no statistically significant difference between
the combined American student groups and the
Turkish students group with respect to attempting to
breach another's online accounts. This result hints at
the pervasiveness of the act of attempting to access
someone else's account without permission across
countries and cultures. The results from Question 2,
comparing the sum of the results from the American
students with their Turkish counterparts, show a
statistically significant difference between the two
sets of data with American students being more
aware of possible legal implications of using
another's account without permission. This
comparison is shown in Table 2 and graphically
depicted in Figure 1. The results from this question
hint at the greater knowledge of information security
within the combined American group, and also a
greater awareness of cyber-crime in general
generated by the mass media in the U.S.

1. Have you ever attempted to login into
another person's online account (email,
online service, ecommerce website, etc.)
without their permission?
2. Are you aware of any laws relating to the
process of attempting to use another
person's online accounts?
3. If no malice is intended when attempting to
log on to another person's online accounts,
do you think it is a useful activity for law
enforcement to investigate and pursue
prosecution for such activities?
4. Have you ever suspected that someone has
logged into your account without
permission?
Although none of the questions specifically mention
a PDOS, attempting to log on to another's online
account without their permission (known as an
attempted account breach) is used as a surrogate
term for a PDOS due to the fact that the term
"PDOS" is unknown to students and a complete
description of PDOS would not be feasible in the
survey. Question 1 directly asks if the student being
surveyed has attempted an online account breach. If
someone has logged onto another's account without
their permission, it can be said then that this person
had the knowledge and skills to have committed a
PDOS instead. Question 2 seeks to examine how
aware students are of cyber security laws related to
a breach of a person's online account. Question 3
seeks to ascertain the attitudes of students with
respect to being caught after committing an online
account breach. If a student believes that an online
account breach that is not malevolent in nature
should not be pursued by law enforcement, then it
can be assumed that either the student sees no wrong

Question 3 is related to Question 2 in that it
ascertains student opinions on the severity of an
online account breach. This question also showed a
statistically significant difference between the two
groups. Turkish students wanted law enforcement to
investigate account breaches, even in cases where no
malice was intended. The more conservative cultural
aspects of Turkey could explain this difference in
attitudes. Another potential reason could again be
that American students are more aware of the
pervasiveness of cyber-crime in society as shown
constantly in the mass media and feel less threatened
by it. The results for Question 3 are displayed in
Table 3 and graphically in Figure 2. With respect to
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Question 4, American students suspected
unauthorized access of their accounts statistically
more often than the Turkish ones. These results are
displayed in Table 4 and graphically in Figure 3.

Again, this could be due to the greater awareness of
cyber-crime in the U.S. and the information security
knowledge of the students involved in the survey.

Table 1 Awareness of Laws (Hypothesis is not confirmed at Alpha = 0.05)

Hypothesis

U.S.
Yes

U.S.
Total

U.S. students are more likely to have attempted an
account breach than Turkish students

31

68

Turkey Turkey
Yes
Total
8

23

P-Value
0.197

Figure 1 Question 2: Comparison between American and Turkish Students

Table 2 Awareness of Laws (Hypothesis confirmed at Alpha = 0.05)

Hypothesis
U.S. students are more aware of laws regarding
un-authorized use of others' online accounts than
Turkish students

32

U.S.
Yes

U.S.
Total

58

93

Turkey Turkey
Yes
Total
9

22

P-Value

0.033
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Figure 2 Question 3: Comparison between American and Turkish Students

Table 3 Importance of Prosecution (Hypothesis confirmed at Alpha = 0.05)

Turkey Turkey
Yes
Total

Hypothesis
U.S. students think investigation and prosecution
of unauthorized logins with no malice intended is
less useful than Turkish students

26

30

U.S.
Yes

U.S.
Total

P-Value

52

90

0.002

Figure 3 Question 4: Comparison between American and Turkish Students
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Table 4 Suspicion of Others Logging In (Hypothesis confirmed at Alpha = 0.05)
Hypothesis

U.S.
Yes

U.S.
Total

U.S. students are more suspicious that others have
logged onto their accounts without permission
than Turkish students

75

94

Turkey Turkey
Yes
Total
22

34

P-Value

0.039

classes, and similar student learning processes.
Routine Activities Theory would dictate that
students should be made aware of the fact that just
by logging onto online services on campus in the
proximity of others, they become a potential victim
for a PDOS attack as well as other cyber crimes. The
first line of defense for university students is to
prevent a common social engineering tactic known
as "shoulder surfing". All parents teach their
children to "look both ways" before crossing a street.
Should not students using online services on
university campuses be taught the same principle (to
prevent observation of their account names and
personal information)? This simple practice of being
cognizant of your surroundings and whether anyone
is watching could be incorporated into a more
comprehensive cyber security awareness plan for
students.

9. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The ultimate goal of a PDOS attack is not to gain
access to an online account; rather it is to prevent a
legitimate online account user from having access to
their own account. Therefore, this action would not
violate existing federal laws such as the
Telecommunications Act or the Computer Fraud and
Abuse act. A PDOS attack is difficult to detect given
that it relies on what is considered to be normal
traffic patterns that would not be seen as out of the
ordinary by the intrusion detection systems used by
online service providers. A traditional DoS attack
aims to stop services for a target device, network, or
system and thereby affect as many people as
possible. In contrast, a PDOS is limited in scope to a
person or small group.
Routine Activities Theory, when applied to cyber
crimes such as a PDOS, suggests that university
students need to be aware that there is a temptation
to commit a PDOS due to the proximity of fellow
students and their constant interface with the Internet
and their online accounts. As put forth in Pratt, et al,
(2010), "... parents, schools, and employers will each
be critical to educating citizens on how to reduce
their exposure to online risks". We recommend that
institutions of higher learning should be providing
students with training on how to avoid becoming a
victim of cyber crimes, including PDOS attacks. By
providing
informal
training,
including
methodologies for preventing the transfer of
information necessary for a cyber attacks such as a
PDOS, the risks of victimization could be reduced.
Cesaroni, et al. (2012) described actions taken to
prevent cyber bullying ranging from informal
education programs to formal policy debates. We
believe that mandatory computer-use ethics training
for all university students would help to reduce the
likelihood of a PDOS or other types of cyber crime
being committed. Such training could be included in
new student orientations, degree program ethics

From a technical perspective, the authors propose
that universities ensure that user accounts are
separate from their public personas or aliases.
Currently, many university accounts, such as email
addresses, give potential attackers all the
information they need to perform a PDOS attack.
The authors recommend that a separate user ID (or
email) is published for external communications
with an internal account remaining private with only
the student and IT staff being aware of its name and
details. This tactic would prevent the initiation of a
PDOS attack on a student's university accounts
without first collecting this internal account
information. It would deter PDOS attacks in much
the same way Network Address Translation (NAT)
is used to shield internal IP addresses from outside
traffic sources to deter attacks on those internal
computers. Many active directory accounts at
corporations already use this process for account
names, and the authors recommend that universities
also adopt this approach.
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